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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO, )
) NO. 44486
Plaintiff-Respondent, )
) ADA COUNTY NO. CR-FE-2015-4470
v. )
)
MITCHELL WILLIAMS JENKINS, ) APPELLANT'S BRIEF
)
Defendant-Appellant. )
________________________________ )
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Mitchell Williams Jenkins was sentenced to a unified term of seven years, with
two years fixed, after he pled guilty to possession of a controlled substance.  He
contends the district court abused its discretion when it imposed this sentence upon him
considering the mitigating factors that exist in this case—most notably, the fact that this
was his first drug conviction and involved a very small quantity of methamphetamine.
He also contends the district court abused its discretion when it relinquished jurisdiction
over him because he successfully completed a rider and received a recommendation for
probation.
2Statement of Facts & Course of Proceedings
Mr. Jenkins was arrested following a traffic stop on March 30, 2015, when he
gave a false name to a police officer and a small baggie of methamphetamine and a
pipe were located in his vehicle.  (Conf. Exs., pp.4-5, 76-77.)  Mr. Jenkins was charged
by Information with possession of a controlled substance, possession of drug
paraphernalia, and providing false information to law enforcement.  (R., pp.23-24.)
Mr. Jenkins entered into an agreement with the State pursuant to which he
agreed to plead guilty to possession of a controlled substance and, in exchange, the
State agreed to dismiss the remaining two counts and recommend a unified sentence of
five years, with two years fixed, and with a period of retained jurisdiction.  (R., pp.37-
38.)  The district court accepted Mr. Jenkins’ guilty plea.  (8/14/15 Tr., p.17, Ls.18-19.)
The district court sentenced Mr. Jenkins to a unified term of seven years, with two years
fixed, and retained jurisdiction.  (10/23/15 Tr., p.13, Ls.11-18; R., p.52.)  The judgment
of conviction was entered on October 28, 2015.  (R., pp.51-55.)
Mr. Jenkins was placed on a CAPP rider, and successfully completed that rider.
(R., pp.57-58.)  By letter dated February 15, 2016, the CAPP rider staff recommended
the district court place Mr. Jenkins on probation.  (Conf. Exs., pp.139-44.)  The district
court held a rider review hearing on March 4, 2016, but continued the hearing to give
Mr. Jenkins a chance to subpoena someone from the Idaho Department of Correction
(IDOC) to explain its recommendation of probation.  (R., p.63.)  Following the hearing,
the district court contacted the IDOC stating it intended to relinquish jurisdiction over
Mr. Jenkins because, in the court’s view, Mr. Jenkins’ behavior on his rider “was
abysmal.”  (R., p.63.)
3In response, the IDOC told the district court Mr. Jenkins should have been placed
in a sex offender treatment program based on his criminal history.  (R., pp.61-66.)
Mr. Jenkins agreed to participate in sex offender treatment and the district court vacated
the continued rider review hearing.  (R., pp.61-66, 67-68.)  Mr. Jenkins arrived at the
North Idaho Correctional Institution (NICI) for sex offender treatment on March 21,
2016.  (Conf. Exs., p.152.)  On July 28, 2016, the NICI staff wrote a letter to the district
court recommending the district court relinquish jurisdiction over Mr. Jenkins.  (Conf.
Exs., pp.152-59.)  The district court relinquished jurisdiction over Mr. Jenkins following a
hearing.  (8/19/16 Tr., p.20, Ls.5-10; R., p.70.)  The order relinquishing jurisdiction was
entered August 24, 2016.  (R., pp.72-74.)  Mr. Jenkins filed a motion pursuant to Idaho
Criminal Rule 35 (“Rule 35”) for reconsideration of sentence on September 9, 2016,
which the district court denied by order dated September 13, 2016.  (R., pp.78, 85-87.)1
1 Mr. Jenkins does not challenge the district court’s denial of his Rule 35 motion in light
of State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 204 (2006).
4ISSUES
1. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed upon Mr. Jenkins a
unified sentence of seven years, with two years fixed, considering the mitigating
factors that exist in this case?
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it relinquished jurisdiction over
Mr. Jenkins?
ARGUMENT
I.
Considering The Mitigating Factors That Exist In This Case, The District Court Abused
Its Discretion When It Imposed Upon Mr. Jenkins A Unified Sentence Of Seven Years,
With Two Years Fixed
Mr. Jenkins asserts that, given any view of the facts, his unified sentence of
seven years, with two years fixed, for possession of a controlled substance is
excessive.  Where, as here, the sentence imposed by the district court is within
statutory limits, “the appellant bears the burden of demonstrating that it is a clear abuse
of discretion.” State v. Miller, 151 Idaho 828, 834 (2011) (quoting State v. Windom, 150
Idaho 873, 875 (2011)).  “When a trial court exercises its discretion in sentencing, ‘the
most fundamental requirement is reasonableness.’” Id. (quoting State v. Hooper, 119
Idaho 606, 608 (1991)).  “A sentence is reasonable if it appears necessary to
accomplish the primary objective of protecting society and to achieve any or all of the
related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation or retribution.” Id. (citation omitted).  “When
reviewing the reasonableness of a sentence this Court will make an independent
examination of the record, ‘having regard to the nature of the offense, the character of
the offender and the protection of the public interest.’” Id. (quoting State v. Shideler,
103 Idaho 593, 594 (1982)).
5The sentence imposed upon Mr. Jenkins was not reasonable given the nature of
his offense, his character, and the protection of the public interest.  Mr. Jenkins was
pulled over when he failed to come to a complete stop before exiting a gas station.
(Conf. Exs., p.4.)  He gave a false name to the police officer out of fear of being
arrested.  (Conf. Exs., p.4.)  The officer located a small quantity of methamphetamine
and a pipe in his vehicle, and Mr. Jenkins said they belonged to him, and not to his
girlfriend, who was a passenger in the vehicle.  (Conf. Exs., p.5.)  Mr. Jenkins did not
meet the criteria for substance abuse or dependence following the GAIN assessment.
(Conf. Exs., pp.14, 64.)  In any case, his attorney explained to the district court at
sentencing that Mr. Jenkins “is certainly done with methamphetamine and . . .
understands the dangers of that continued use.”  (10/23/15 Tr., p.10, Ls.14-18.)
The use and abuse of illegal drugs is serious, but Mr. Jenkins’ status as a first
time drug offender and the small quantity of methamphetamine involved in this case did
not warrant the sentence imposed.  The sentence was also not warranted by
Mr. Jenkins’ character.  Mr. Jenkins earned his GED in 2003 and was planning to attend
the College of Western Idaho in the fall of 2015.  (Conf. Exs. p.12.)  He told the district
court he wanted to study horticulture and start a landscaping business.  (10/23/15
Tr., p.12, L.25 – p.13, L.3.)  Mr. Jenkins described his mother as a recovering
methamphetamine addict and he has clearly struggled with addiction.  (Conf. Exs.,
p.11.)   The district court should have made a greater effort to direct its sentence toward
rehabilitation, with the understanding that Mr. Jenkins can make a positive contribution
to society.
6A unified sentence of seven years, with two years fixed, was also not necessary
to ensure the protection of the public interest.  Mr. Jenkins has a criminal history, but
was assessed as presenting only a moderate risk to reoffend.  (Conf. Exs., pp.15-16)
Mr. Jenkins successfully completed a rider in 2004 and has always registered as a sex
offender, as required because of a prior conviction.  (Conf. Exs., p.9.)  Counsel for
Mr. Jenkins recommended probation, and told the district court Mr. Jenkins had a place
to live and would find employment.  (10/23/15 Tr., p.10, Ls.1-3.)  The State
recommended a unified sentence of five years, with two years fixed, and with a period
of retained jurisdiction.  (10/23/15 Tr., p.7, Ls.15-23.)  While this still would have been a
harsh sentence, the district court exceeded even the State’s recommendation.  In light
of the mitigating factors that exist in this case, and notwithstanding the aggravating
factors, the district court abused its discretion when it sentenced Mr. Jenkins to a unified
term of seven years, with two years fixed.
II.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Relinquished Jurisdiction Over
Mr. Jenkins
This Court reviews a district court’s decision to relinquish jurisdiction for an abuse
of discretion. See State v. Latneau, 154 Idaho 165, 166 (2013); see also I.C. § 19-
2601(4).  “A court properly exercises its discretion when it (1) correctly perceives the
issue to be one of discretion, (2) acts within the outer boundaries of its discretion and
consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it,
and (3) reaches its decision by an exercise of reason.” Latneau, 154 Idaho at 166
(citation omitted).  The district court abused its discretion when it relinquished
7jurisdiction over Mr. Jenkins, because it did not act within the outer boundaries of its
discretion when it contacted the IDOC and questioned the IDOC’s decision to
recommend Mr. Jenkins be placed on probation following his successful completion of
the CAPP rider.
Mr. Jenkins was originally placed on a CAPP rider, at the determination of the
IDOC.  (Conf. Exs., p.139.)  Mr. Jenkins did not receive any formal disciplinary
sanctions on his rider, and the CAPP staff recommended to the district court that it
place Mr. Jenkins on probation.  (Conf. Exs., pp.139, 141.)  The district court had
concerns about Mr. Jenkins’ performance on his rider, largely stemming from the fact
that Mr. Jenkins commented he would not let his 14-year-old daughter wear a mini skirt
and would “make her change” because “these girls around these days [are] just asking
for it.”  (Conf. Exs., pp.146-47.)  The district court was concerned about this comment in
light of Mr. Jenkins’ criminal history, which included prior convictions for battery and
statutory rape.  (Conf. Exs., p.38.)  The district court contacted the IDOC stating it
intended to relinquish jurisdiction over Mr. Jenkins because, in the court’s view,
Mr. Jenkins’ behavior on his rider “was abysmal.”  (R., p.63.)  In response, the IDOC
determined Mr. Jenkins should have been placed in a sex offender treatment program
based on his criminal history.  (R., pp.61-66.)
The record reflects that Mr. Jenkins agreed to participate in sex offender
treatment.  (R., pp.61-66, 67-68.)  However, Mr. Jenkins did not believe he needed sex
offender treatment, and thus performed poorly on his second rider.  The NICI staff
stated “[Mr. Jenkins] frequently shared his opinion that this program was stupid,
inconsistent, a joke, and he should not be at NICI since he had served out his time on
8his sex offense.  Mr. Jenkins’ attitude was very hostile toward the program and the
staff.”  (Conf. Exs., pp.155-56.)  Further, “Mr. Jenkins made it clear from day one of
group that he did not believe he needed the program and was participating under
protest.  He frequently commented that he had committed his sex offense 10 years ago,
had not reoffended, and had topped out his time . . . .  His participation in group, at best,
could be described as false compliance.”  (Conf. Exs., p.156.)
The district court should have placed Mr. Jenkins on probation despite his
performance on his second rider, which was not tied to the offense Mr. Jenkins
committed in this case.  At his rider review hearing, Mr. Jenkins asked the district court
“for the chance to be released on probation” stating he would “make full use of the
opportunity to prove to the Court that I’m a changed man.”  (8/19/16 Tr., p.19, Ls.19-22.)
He told the district court he “no longer want[ed] to live the lifestyle [he] was living” and
planned on staying busy with work, going to the gym, and attending substance abuse
support meetings.  (8/19/16 Tr., p.17, Ls.14-16; p.18, Ls.5-9.)  The district court abused
its discretion when it all-but required Mr. Jenkins to undergo sex offender treatment
following a drug conviction, and ultimately relinquished jurisdiction because Mr. Jenkins
did not actively participate in that treatment.
9CONCLUSION
Mr. Jenkins respectfully requests that this Court reduce his sentence as it deems
appropriate.  Alternatively, he requests that this Court vacate the district court’s order
relinquishing jurisdiction over him and remand this case to the district court with
instructions to place him on probation.
DATED this 15th day of March, 2017.
__________/s/_______________
ANDREA W. REYNOLDS
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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